Proposta di risoluzione dell’ANM al ‘IAJ 65th Annual Meeting’ di Taipei

In Italy, autonomy and independence of the entire judiciary (judges and prosecutors too) are guaranteed by the Constitution.

In the last few weeks, four reforms of some rules of our Constitution have been presented by some members of the Government majority (and are being discussed by Parliament, which has legislative power for constitutional reform) that highlight the desire to subject all magistrates, judges and prosecutors too, to political power, and the Italian National Association of Magistrates, whose delegates we are here today, has expressed strong concern about this.

The reform proposal only shows that it wants to guarantee the constitutional principle of the judge’s independence (or third party status as well), but in reality it proposes:

1. to change the composition of both the self-governing bodies – judges and prosecutors – of the Italian judiciary (named Consiglio Superiore della Magistratura), by providing for half of its members to be chosen by the government, id est by the politicians. At the moment the self-governing body is unique and it is composed for two-thirds by magistrates and just for one-third by political appointees;
2. to allow that the magistrates will be chosen by lot. They are now elected and this is a more guaranteeing condition for the independence and autonomy of the self-governing body as well;
3. to prohibit the higher councils of the judiciary from opening files to protect the independence of individual magistrates and to prohibit to express opinions on reforms in the field of justice too;
4. to abolish the rule in the Constitution that provides that magistrates are distinguished only by the functions they perform, which could lead to the creation of hierarchies that are dangerous to the guarantee of independence (external and internal too);
5. to prohibit prosecutors from becoming judges and vice versa, but at the same time to provide for the direct appointment of lawyers as magistrates at every level of the jurisdiction without selection by public competition, which is now the only way to become a magistrate. This will compromise the thirdness, the professionalism and the independence of magistrates, which is also guaranteed by selection through public competition: finally, the risk is to have politically appointed magistrates at every level of jurisdiction;
6. to reduce the principle of mandatory prosecution, limiting it to the cases and methods provided for by law. The consequence will be that politics will choose which crimes to prosecute and will try to influence the activity of the public prosecutor, who will be controlled by the governmental majority of the historical moment in which he will be operating (it is not fantasy because it has already happened in other European countries in the recent past).

This shows ignorance of the fact that, for a truly guarantor legal system, the public prosecutor, as an “organ of justice” that pursues the public interest by gathering evidence also in favour of the accused, does not have a role comparable to that – also essential, but different – of the lawyer defending private interests.

Therefore, it is clear that the ratio legis of the constitutional reform proposals is not to improve the speed and effectiveness of the criminal justice system and the response to everyone’s expectations for a fair, impartial and equitable justice, but only to increase the interference of Politics on the Judiciary.

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Leggi e scarica qui la richiesta di risoluzione dell’Anm risoluzione IAJ

In foto in evidenza: Il magistrato Monica Mastrandrea nel suo intervento a IAJ 65^th Annual Meeting a Taipei, Taiwan.